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Abstract
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 demonstrated that the United States’
emergency response capability, while robust, was disorganized in that organizations were
not prepared or equipped to coordinate response actions across multiple agencies at a
national level. This research investigates whether NIMS and the AFIMS structure is
optimal for Air Force emergency managers, or whether, while maintaining NIMS
compliance, there is a more effective way for the Air Force to organize its emergency
management and response forces. Specifically this research focuses on the organization
of the EOC and investigates whether shifting from the current structure of the ESFs to the
FLOP structure found in the ICS may be a more efficient use of personnel based on the
organizational requirements of the Air Force. This research will employ DSMs to
independently evaluate the merits of both the ESF and FLOP construct for specific
scenarios based on the tasks outlined in the Air Force’s CEMP 10-2. For seven of the
eight scenarios examined, ESFs are reaching less than 60% capacity, in fact, most only
reach 30% capacity or below.

On the other hand, FLOP capacity is significantly

increased, however, in some of the more demanding scenarios, capacities exceed more
than 100%.
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AN EVALUATION OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF AIR
FORCE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTERS USING SOCIAL NETWORK
ANALYSIS AND DESIGN STRUCTURE MATRICES
I. Introduction
Introduction
Emergency response was forever changed in the United States following the
attacks on September 11, 2001.

In an attempt to improve the United States’s

organizational interoperability during major disasters, the nation developed a new
emergency response doctrine to be implemented at all levels, including local, county,
state and federal agencies. As a federal agency, the Department of Defense (DoD) was
required to implement the change to ensure military responders could easily integrate
with local responders when necessary.

This thesis researches the Air Force’s

implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), specifically as it
applies to the Air Force’s Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), investigating
effectiveness of the current emergency operations center structures. This chapter outlines
the background, objectives and justification for the research and briefly describes the
research methodology, closing with a preview of the remaining chapters.

Background
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 demonstrated that the United States’
emergency response capability, while robust, was disorganized in that organizations were
not prepared or equipped to coordinate response actions across multiple agencies at a
national level. Eleven days after the attacks President Bush announced the creation of the
Office of Homeland Security by executive order to develop and implement a national
1

strategy to prepare for and respond to terrorist attacks. The official announcement from
the President’s office stated:
The mission of the Office will be to develop and coordinate the implementation of
a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist
threats or attacks. The Office will coordinate the executive branch’s efforts to
detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist
attacks within the United States. (Office of the Press Secretary, 2001)
On 25 November 2002, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was
officially created with the passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which
recognized the new cabinet level position in the White House and moved 22 agencies
related to homeland security within the new department (DHS, 2012). Shortly after the
Department’s creation, President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential
Directive/HSPD-5 which ordered DHS to develop and administer a National Incident
Management System (NIMS) which would be adopted by all federal agencies including
those within the Department of Defense (Office of the Press Secretary, 2003).
In response to the President’s directive, the Air Force developed the Air Force
Incident Management System (AFIMS) as a means of implementing NIMS within the
unique framework of the United States Air Force. AFIMS is defined by Air Force
Instruction (AFI) 10-2501, the governing regulation on Air Force Emergency
Management as:
A methodology designed to incorporate the requirements of HSPD-5, the NIMS,
the NRP and OSD guidance while preserving the unique military requirements of
the expeditionary Air Force. AFIMS provides the Air Force with an incident
management system that is consistent with the single, comprehensive approach to
domestic incident management. AFIMS provides the Air Force with the
coordinating structures, processes, and protocols required to integrate its specific
authorities into the collective framework of Federal departments and agencies for
2

action to include mitigation, prevention, preparedness, response and recovery
activities. (USAF, 2007)
A broad overview of the organizational structure of AFIMS can be seen in Figure
1 below. At the strategic level is the Crisis Action Team (CAT) and is chaired by the
Wing Commander and manned with the wing staff and group commanders.

The

objective of the CAT is to evaluate the overall strategic objectives of the base and the
current emergency. For example, is the base capable of continuing its primary mission
and function while this emergency is ongoing?
resources to respond to the emergency?

Does the base have the necessary

What needs to be reported to higher-

headquarters? At the tactical level is the incident command staff. The incident command
staff is lead by the incident commander and is organized by four major functions into the
Finance, Logistics, Operations, and Plans (FLOP) organizational structure. The Incident
Command System (ICS) is designed to be extremely flexible and expandable to meet the
needs of the current situation. The incident command staff, are the personnel responsible
for expending the resources at the scene to achieve the tactical objectives of the
emergency response. Finally the EOC operates as the hub of the emergency response and
recovery.

The primary role of the EOC is information and resource gathering and

disseminating. The EOC is responsible for providing the resources necessary to the
Incident Commander for use in response to the emergency. The EOC also develops a
common operating picture by attempting to consolidate the information gathered by the
personnel in the EOC. The EOC is organized by the Emergency Support Function (ESF)
structure.

The ESF structure is a standardized 15 organization structure grouping

“federal resources and capabilities into functional areas that are most frequently needed

3

in a national response” (FEMA, 2008). Finally, during emergencies, individual Unit
Control Centers (UCCs) stand up, as a means to supporting the response. Typically, the
UCCs provide information or resources as required through communication from the
EOC. Currently there is no defined staffing or organizational structure for the UCC, each
unit is responsible for adequately staffing the UCCs as required.

Figure 1 - AFIMS Organizational Structure
The National Response Framework (NRF) builds upon NIMS and “provides the
structure and mechanisms for national-level policy and operational direction for incident
management” (FEMA, 2008). The NRF stipulates that “EOCs may be organized by
major discipline... by jurisdiction… by Emergency Support Function… or more likely by
some combination thereof,” indicating the flexibility offered within NIMS and the NRF
to allow agencies to structure themselves in a method they deem optimal while still
maintaining federal compliance (FEMA, 2008). The overwhelming majority of local and
state EOCs are organized under the ESF construct. Because of the local and state EOC
organization, and a lack of available research into alternatives, the Air Force chose to
adopt the ESF construct as well.

4

The ESF structure was initially developed for use in the National Response
Coordination Center (NRCC) “to achieve an effective national response to any incident
that occurs” (FEMA, 2008).

National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) has

developed and standardized 15 ESFs as a “mechanism to coordinate functional
capabilities and resources provided by… departments and agencies” (FEMA, 2008).
However, the ESF construct became the primary method of organization because it easily
aligned the primary functions of a local municipality in a standardized method in an
attempt to simplify emergency response. Table 1 - Emergency Support Functions and
Air Force Equivalent Units (United States Air Force, 2009) lists the ESFs, their basic
responsibilities and the equivalent Air Force unit responsible to fill those roles.
While this method is efficient at the municipal and state level, the ESF method
does not take into account the Air Force’s unique organization. Many Air Force subject
matter experts in the Emergency Management career field confirmed that the mismatch
between the Air Force’s organization and the ESF structure causes inefficiencies
(Messina, 2012). First, there is a significant level of redundancy, while 15 separate
organizations are designed to staff each ESF, based on the current construct, the Civil
Engineer Squadron maintains primary responsibility on seven ESFs, and the Logistics
Readiness Squadron and Medical Group holds primary responsibility for two ESFs.
Additionally, ESF #6, Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services,
are Force Support Squadron functions, except for Housing which again falls to the Civil
Engineer Squadron, thus further blurring the distinctions found within the ESF construct
(United States Air Force, 2009). Moreover, the ESFs do not take into account a number
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of Air Force functions critical to emergency response, including Finance, Contracting,
Airfield Operations, Aircraft Maintenance, Chaplaincy, Wing Safety, Bio-Environmental
Engineering, and Judge Advocate Generals. Table 1 below lists the 15 ESFs and Air
Force equivalent units.
Table 1 - Emergency Support Functions and Air Force Equivalent Units (United
States Air Force, 2009)
ESF
ESF #1
ESF #2
ESF #3
ESF #4
ESF #5
ESF #6
ESF #7
ESF #8
ESF #9
ESF #10
ESF #11
ESF #12
ESF #13
ESF #14
ESF #15

Responsibility
Transportation
Communications
Public Works and Engineering
Firefighting
Emergency Management
Mass Care, Emergency Assistance,
Housing, and Human Services
Logistics Management and Resources
Support
Public Health and Medical Services
Search and Rescue
Oil and Hazardous Materials Response
Agriculture and Natural Resources
Energy
Public Safety and Security
Long Term Recovery
External Affairs

Air Force Equivalent
Logistics Readiness
Squadron
Communications Squadron
Civil Engineer Squadron
Civil Engineer Squadron
Civil Engineer Squadron
Force Support Squadron
Logistics Readiness
Squadron
Medical Group
Civil Engineer Squadron
Civil Engineer Squadron
Medical Group
Civil Engineer Squadron
Security Forces Squadron
Civil Engineer Squadron
Public Affairs

However, another method of organization is available to the Air Force. The
Incident Command Staff (ICS) on scene is organized via the FLOP structure. Mirroring
that structure at the EOC has the potential to widen the lines of communication between
the ICS and the EOC, from just the Incident Commander (IC) and the EOC Director to
each primary member of the FLOP staffs. Additionally, it allows for greater flexibility
within the EOC by allowing each FLOP functional leader to augment his or her staff with
the appropriate units to specifically tailor the response to the emergency at hand. This
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research will attempt to compare the two organizational structures, and attempt to
identify which is better tailored to meet the needs of Air Force Emergency responders.

Research Problem
This research investigates whether NIMS and the AFIMS structure is optimal for
Air Force emergency managers and responders in its current form, or whether, while
maintaining NIMS compliance, there is a more effective way for the Air Force to
organize its emergency management and response forces. Specifically this thesis focuses
on the organization of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and investigates whether
shifting from the current structure of the Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) to the
FLOP structure found in the ICS may be a more efficient use of personnel based on the
organizational requirements of the Air Force.

Research Objectives
In order to determine which organizational structure provides the most effective
capability for response and recovery, an analysis of individual personnel capacity should
be conducted for each individual in the EOC. Capacity in this context is “the capability
to complete tasks and usually refers to the volume of resources available for task
realization” (Horman, 2001). By evaluating individual capacities, a quantitative analysis
can be accomplished to determine individual workloads of personnel in the EOC to
conduct direct comparisons between the two organizational structures.

7

Research Approach
In order to calculate individual capacities, and given the fact that each emergency
scenario is inherently unique; a comprehensive list of tasks along with who is responsible
for them is required.

In attempt to develop a comprehensive list of tasks, the

Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan 10-2 (CEMP 10-2) was used. According
to Air Force Instruction 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management Program Planning
and Operations, the CEMP 10-2 “provides comprehensive guidance for emergency
response to physical threats resulting from major accidents, natural disasters,
conventional attacks, terrorist attack and CBRN attacks” (United States Air Force, 2009).
To accomplish this research a Design Structure Matrix (DSM) methodology was used.
Design structure matrices (DSMs) can take the tasks and responsibilities, and develop a
response timeline in the form of a Gantt chart that can be used to determine the total
response duration, and individual personnel durations to determine individual capacities
(Eppinger & Browning, 2012).

DSM analysis will simulate the estimated time to

complete the tasks outlined in the CEMP 10-2, and determine the capacity of each EOC
position.

This information can then be used to develop an optimal organizational

structure based on actual response requirements for specific emergency scenarios.

Scope, Assumptions and Limitations
This study focuses solely on the organizational design of the Air Force Incident
Management System and Air Force EOCs.

Those organizations outside the USAF

should evaluate the usefulness of this research towards their own organizations carefully
as its applicability may vary. While the facts and figures are specifically tailored for Air
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Force Emergency Management, it is likely that others may find the methodology
beneficial for their own organizations. However, application of these results towards
other organizations may require further research prior to implementation outside of the
United States Air Force.
Some assumptions were required in order to accomplish this research. First,
while the CEMP 10-2 calls itself a comprehensive plan, it is impossible for it to be truly
comprehensive as each emergency has an infinite number of unknowns that cannot
otherwise be planned for. As such, the CEMP 10-2 is “comprehensive” in the sense that
it includes all the tasks that are universally common for each emergency scenario.
Therefore the checklists of the CEMP 10-2 offer the maximum level of detail available
for planning purposes, thus providing the data required for the DSM analysis.
Furthermore, the CEMP 10-2 has approximately 28 standard emergency checklists,
spanning four incident types. In attempt to narrow the scope, only eight checklists were
chosen in only two most common incident types, major accidents, and natural disasters.
The eight scenarios were chosen based on their dissimilarities in consequence/impact and
complexity to evaluate a wide range of scenario types without being required to analyze
every single scenario. Additionally, task duration estimates were required to conduct the
DSM analysis.

Because task duration estimate data are not readily available, an

assumption was made that the task durations for each task was approximately the same.
This assumption is considered valid because typically the role of the EOC is to gather and
disseminate information to those actually accomplishing the tasks, rather than
accomplishing the tasks themselves.

Because the role is to primarily gather and

disseminate information, it is valid to assume that this takes approximately the same
9

amount of time regardless of the task, in comparison to the duration times required to
actually accomplish the task.
Furthermore, some limitations arose from the DSM model used for the
simulation. Due to the way the simulation model is written, the maximum duration is
limted to 256 time-step intervals, (the maximum number of columns in a Microsoft Excel
spreadsheet). Because of the complexity of the scenarios that were researched, and that
they have a relatively long duration, a five-minute time-step duration was used as a
means to overcome this limitation. While using a five-minute time-step duration slightly
lowers overall simulation fidelity as compared to a one-minute time-step duration, it was
necessary to ensure the results stayed within the 256 time-step maximum. Finally, a
fundamental assumption of the DSM model is that completion times are identical for both
the ESF and FLOP organizational constructs because the Gantt chart is based on the
required checklist tasks, and are accomplished in the same order regardless of who
accomplishes them.

Preview
The remaining chapters focus on presenting additional detail related to the
problem statement, proposed solutions and results. Chapter II provides a review of past
research into Emergency Management and the implementation of NIMS, a foundation in
Network Analysis and Design Structure Matrices setting the framework for the
organizational design of the EOC. Chapter III outlines the method for evaluating the
current EOC structure against different alternatives. Specifically, it explains the use of
DSMs, and how individual capacities are calculated for each individual EOC personnel.
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Results will be presented in Chapter IV, and includes the average process duration times,
average capacities for both the ESF and FLOP constructs, and a visual comparison of the
two constructs based on the eight scenarios evaluated.

Finally Chapter V offers a

conclusion and recommendation for the organizational structure of the EOC, and
provides a decision support tool for EOC Directors to optimally staff the EOC based on
the given emergency.

11

II. Literature Review
Introduction
While little research has been accomplished on AFIMS itself, many scholars have
researched the effectiveness of current emergency management doctrine and policy, to
include NIMS and the NRF.

This chapter will review the literature including a

background of Social Network Analysis (SNA) and Design Structure Matrices (DSM)
and their link to emergency management and EOC organization.

Specifically, this

chapter will investigate research by A. Dekker (2002) on Force, Intelligence Networking
and Command and Control (C2) (FINC) and the role organizational structure plays in
military unit effectiveness through use of SNA. Robert Houghton, et al. (2006) expanded
upon Dekker’s (2002) research by examining the ICS of United Kingdom (UK) police
and fire response and evaluating them through Dekker’s SNA C2 architecture
methodologies. Finally, Maj. Joseph Legradi took the results of Dekker (2002) and
Houghton, et al. (2006) and applied the research specifically to military and civilian
EOCs. Legradi concluded that significant differences existed between how military and
civilian EOCs operate despite the similar organizational structure, and recommended
further research on whether military EOCs could be better organized to suit the specific
needs of military emergency response. This literature review investigates this line of
research and sets the framework for the introduction of DSMs to evaluate EOC
organizational structure.

12

Network Theory and Social Network Analysis
Network theory has a broad range of applications in areas of biology, computer
science, economics, operations research, particle physics, statistical physics, and
sociology. Specifically, the use of network theory in sociology has grown since the mid1930s, and has now become a standard methodology of research to understand and map
the interactions of people in a number of environments from office and family culture to
international diplomacy and politics. With the rise in the popularity of research on
emergency management (EM) in the decade following the terrorist attacks on September
11, 2001, it was only a matter of time before SNA would be used to investigate the
internal and external networks found in many of the EM fields. Articles by Dekker
(2002), Houghton, et al. (2006), and Legradi (2009) set a framework for the discussion
and appropriateness of use of SNA in military and EM organizations. However, it is
important to first develop a basic foundation in SNA itself, its history and its application.
Social Network Analysis can trace its roots to three distinct academic disciplines:
psychology, anthropology, and sociology (Knoke & Yang, 2008, p. vii).

Psychologist

Jacob Moreno, the founder of the journal Sociometry, developed and first used the
methodology in 1937 by measuring the strength of social relations to “better study the
relationship between social structures and psychological well-being” (Knoke & Yang,
2008, p. vii). However, the most famous early social network analysts are psychologist
Elton Mayo and anthropologist W. Lloyd Warner whose studies of the Hawthorne Plant
of the Western Electric Company in Chicago Illinois in the mid-1930s set the standard for
future research within the field. Their use of SNA developed the foundation for what has
since been described as the Hawthorne Effect, or the principle that a research
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participant’s behavior may be “related only to the special social situation and social
treatment they received” (French, 1950, p. 82). However, SNA as a scientific method did
not truly gain popularity until the 1970s, and has continued to grow exponentially since
then. Only a handful of published journal articles used the term “social network” in their
abstract in 1970 but more than 2500 articles included the term in 2005 (Knoke & Yang,
2008, p. 1).
According to Knoke and Yang, there are three basic underlying assumptions to
SNA. The first assumption is that “structural relations are often more important for
understanding observed behaviors than are such attributes as age, gender, value, and
ideology” (2008, p. 4). In other words, it is the relationship between the two actors that is
significant, not the unique characteristics of the individuals. A good example is the
student-teacher relationship, or the relationship between coworkers.

There is an

expectation of behavior of both actors that is unique to the relationship, but those same
individuals may act differently when placed in another contextual scenario.

The

difference isn’t heavily influenced by the attributes of the individuals, but instead the
social context of the relationship itself.
The second assumption Knoke and Yang introduce is that “social networks affect
perceptions, beliefs, and actions through a variety of structural mechanisms that are
socially constructed by relations among entities” (2008, p. 5). This assumption has been
popularized through the common saying that “it isn’t what you know, but who you
know.” Individual relationships within the social network affect the flow of information
and the capabilities of the organization significantly. It is not uncommon to observe that
information often flows fastest through informal networks and cliques rather than through
14

more official chains of communication. Understanding and exploiting those informal
networks within an organization can lead to increased productivity and office
capabilities; however, they can also “reinforce prejudices and fan conflicts with outgroups” making it important to properly manage and mitigate potential issues derived
from informal networks (Knoke & Yang, 2008, p. 5).
Finally, the third assumption is that “structural relations should be viewed as
dynamic processes” (Knoke & Yang, 2008, p. 6). That is to say change should be
expected because humans are involved. If one person is underperforming due to illness,
or a relationship is strained due to personal differences between the individuals, the entire
social network can be affected. Additionally, the social network is inherently affected
when people are introduced to or removed from the network. The new network must readjust to accommodate these changes which can significantly disrupt the workflow until
the network can rebalance itself.
A key to understanding and researching social networks came with the
introduction of the sociogram. A sociogram, as seen in Figure 2 below, is a series of
nodes which represent individuals within a social network and lines which indicate the
relations between the individuals. To take expand upon the sociogram, weightings and
directional vectors can be applied to relation lines allowing for further mathematical
analysis and interpretation. A foundation for this analysis was introduced via graph
theory by Dorwin Cartwright in 1956, by broadening Heider’s theory of balance from the
mathematical series of linear graphs to “configurations of many different sorts, such as
communication networks, power systems, sociometric structures” and much more
(Cartwright, 1956). Cartwright’s generalization also expanded Heider’s theory from the
15

typical linear “x” and “y” graph to a more general collection of “axioms and formulas
used to analyze the points and lines” (Legradi, 2009, p. 15).

Figure 2- Sociogram
Emergency Management and Social Network Analysis Research
Dekker (2002) recognized that there are four primary goals, or outputs, of SNA.
The first goal is to “visualize communication and other relationships between people
and/or groups by means of diagrams” (2002, p. 2). Secondly, SNA creates a capability to
study factors that influence and correlations between relationships (Dekker, 2002, p. 2).
The third goal Dekker identifies is the ability to “draw out implications of the relational
data” to identify the shortcomings and “bottlenecks” found within the network (2002, p.
2).

Finally, and most importantly, according to Dekker, is the goal to develop

recommendations based on the SNA to improve communication, “and (in military terms)
to speed up the orient-observe-decide-act (OODA) loop or decision cycle” (2002, p. 2).
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With those goals in mind, Dekker developed four primary archetypes of command
and control (C2) based on SNA. These archetypes, summarized by Legradi (2009) can
be seen in Table 2 below. To help illustrate the archetypes, Dekker identified actual

Table 2 - Command & Control Archetypes, (Legradi

military units that are organized under a similar C2 architecture. The four types include
Centralized C2, used by Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft who
gather intelligence from multiple sources to control and prioritize targets for strike
aircraft. The second archetype is the Split C2. This model is often used by land forces
when centralized C2 becomes too cumbersome due to the geographical separation of the
units. The Split C2 archetype allows for the addition of “tactical adjustments to new
information by subordinate units” but can be criticized “since the delays inherent in the
hierarchy may negate the benefits of centralized planning” in high operations tempos
(Dekker, 2002, p. 5). The Distributed C2 archetype places a high level of confidence in
the personnel on the ground to make decisions based on the current conditions in a high-
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threat environment. Dekker (2002) notes that this archetype is often employed by special
operations units, and can also be seen in how most terrorist cells operate due to the
continually changing circumstances in which they operate, where it is impractical to pass
information up to decision-makers. The final archetype is the Negotiated C2 archetype.
This is often employed by emergency services personnel (fire and ambulance) when they
are responsible for a fixed area, but may negotiate with units outside their area of
responsibility (AOR) for assistance during a large scale emergency (Dekker, 2002).
Finally, Dekker doubles the number of archetypes (for a total of eight) by adding
an additional variable to accommodate for information sharing, which allows units on the
ground to pass information to all higher headquarters for information to be fused and
redistributed again at the lower levels. While this information sharing attribute does not
change the sociograms of the archetypes in Table 2 above, Dekker recognizes it adds one
additional “time step” to each of the archetypes for analyzing associated time delays from
initial command to execution (2002, p. 9). The addition of the information sharing
attribute becomes exceptionally important when evaluating the Negotiated C2
architecture, as it allows for units on the ground to negotiate directly with other units
through “self-synchronization” setting the foundation for the emergence of Network
Centric Warfare (NCW) in military doctrine by maximizing a ground unit’s autonomy
and capabilities (Dekker, 2002).
To test his archetypes, Dekker developed his own SNA methodology called
“Force, Intelligence, Networking, and C2” or FINC (Dekker, 2002, p. 2). Using a Javabased application developed by the Electronics and Surveillance Research Laboratory of
the Australian Department of Defence called CAVALIER, Dekker was able to input his
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four archetypes into the program to see how each C2 archetype would respond to a
specific scenario he developed by measuring the time-lag introduced by each C2
archetype and measuring the number of “turns” required to complete the mission. By
incorporating attributes including intelligence quality, communication delays, and
geographic area covered, Dekker was able to quantify four network measures, the
information flow coefficient, the coordination coefficient, the intelligence coefficient, and
intelligence volumes (Dekker, 2002, pp. 14-17). The key point, as noted by Legradi
(2009, p. 20) is “that once the network is discovered, quantifiable values can be assigned
and the network can be analyzed and adapted to find better functioning networks to
accomplish the mission” thus setting a foundation for the validity of this research stream.
As a follow-on to Dekker’s (2002) research, Houghton, et al. (2006), from the
University of Birmingham, United Kingdom, chose to conduct an SNA applying
Dekker’s archetypes to the C2 mission in emergency services operations, specifically
focusing on police and fire services in the UK. Houghton, et al.’s (2006) hypothesis
stated that if an organization was structured contrary to the way the network naturally
operated, a tension could develop leading to impaired team performance. Additionally,
due to the changing nature of organizations, whether from an increasing reliance on
technology, the employment of larger geographical AORs, or any other myriad reasons, it
is becoming clearer that traditional C2 structures of the past may no longer be the optimal
C2 structures of today (Houghton, et al., 2006).
Houghton, et al. (2006) point out that with the increase in ease of information
sharing over time, networks are, from an SNA perspective, becoming denser. Increasing
the density of networks has the potential to introduce both benefits and drawbacks. One
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benefit is that since most individuals are interconnected within a denser network, those
individuals can more naturally create sub-teams as necessary to attack specific challenges
(Houghton, et al., 2006).

Additionally, Houghton, et al. (2006) recognize that

information will likely flow more quickly in dense networks, as the individuals rely less
upon formal communication by employing informal methods instead. As a drawback, a
denser network has the potential to develop additional intermediate C2 elements resulting
in greater information processing delays (Houghton, et al., 2006, p. 8).
To investigate their observations further, Houghton, et al. (2006) created a SNA
of six emergency responses, three fire responses and three police responses respectively.
The research of Houghton, et al. (2006) examined the tactical response level of the
Incident Command Staff (ICS), specifically focusing on the communication between the
Incident Commander (IC) and the different actors/organizations below the IC.

After

developing the social network, Houghton, et al. (2006) assigned a relative importance
value to each node and compared them using a sociometric and centrality index and
identified the key players based on these calculations. After identifying the key players
in the response, Houghton, et al. (2006) then attempted to categorize each response into
one of Dekker’s (2002) archetypes.
The findings of Houghton, et al. (2006) did not support Dekker’s assertion that
emergency response networks modeled the negotiated C2 archetype. Instead, Houghton,
et al. (2006) observed that all the police networks demonstrated the split C2 architecture,
two of the three fire response networks modeled the distributed C2 architecture and the
final fire network modeled a slight modification to a centralized C2 architecture.
However, Houghton et al.’s research validated that Dekker’s archetypes effectively apply
20

to the emergency management community and that many attributes can be quantified to
conduct SNA to evaluate sociometric status and centrality.
Legradi’s 2009 research attempted to expand the research of Houghton et al. and
Dekker by determining the similarities and differences of civilian and Air Force
emergency response efforts. Legradi (2009) chose to focus his research at the EOC level
to better understand how social networks played a role in that level of response. In order
to accomplish his research, Legradi (2009) surveyed both civilian and Air Force ESF
personnel to compare response characteristics between the two types of organizations.
For the purpose of the survey, Legradi (2009) developed a Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear, High Yield Explosive (CBRNE) scenario happening just outside
the gate of a fictional military installation. Legradi (2009) left the scenario intentionally
vague to allow for broad interpretation by the respondents of the survey. Beyond simple
demographic information, Legradi (2009) asked only two questions of the respondents
based on the scenario. Quoted below are the two survey questions Legradi used in his
survey:
On the following scale please select the frequency you would need to
communicate with each ESF or function listed below during the crisis event, in
order to exchange information, documents, schedules and other resources to get
your job done [emphasis Legradi’s] (Legradi, 2009).
On the following scale please select the frequency you would need to
communicate with each ESF or function listed below during the crisis event, in
order to seek inputs, advice and before making a key decision [emphasis
Legradi’s] (Legradi, 2009).
The scale referenced the respondents used to answer the questions used the
descriptive words never, very rarely, rarely, occasionally, frequently and very frequently.
With this information, Legradi (2009) was able to develop task and decision networks for
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analysis and determine key attributes of both civilian and military EOC social networks
including, a network closeness index (NCI), flow betweenness centrality (FBC), and a
network flow betweenness index (NFBI).

Specifically, with these metrics, Legradi

(2009) was able to mathematically identify distinct differences between military and
civilian EOC networks. In comparison of both NCI and FBC, Legradi determined that
the civilian and military EOCs have “very few key players in common” which breaks
from the expectation that in an identical emergency both organizations would respond
similarly (Legradi, 2009).

This lack of similarity has the potential to “lead to confusion,

time delays, duplication of efforts and a reduced level of performance” when both
organizations are expected to work together in the joint environment (Legradi, 2009).
These differences are particularly interesting due to the fact that since both EOCs are
required to adopt the NRF, in theory both social networks “would handle the scenario in a
similar manner” (Legradi, 2009).

However, in addition to these differences, Legradi

(2009) observed that the centrality of both networks is very high, recognizing that ESF
members are exceptionally good at interacting with other ESFs when they are required to
make decisions or accomplish tasks.
Because of the distinct differences in how the two organizations responded,
Legradi recommended future research be applied to military EOCs to determine if
performance could be improved by a new organizational structure. Legradi speculated
that the four main components of the ICS (Finance, Logistics, Operations and Plans) are
likely present in the EOC and proposed that the ICS may be a strong starting point for
research into a new organizational method for military EOCs.
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Design Structure Matrices
As another methodology of network theory, Design Structure Matrices (DSMs)
span both operations and systems research and SNA. DSMs are exceptionally powerful
for modeling and analyzing complex organizations and processes. “As a tool for system
analysis, DSM provides a compact and clear representation of a complex system and a
capture method for the interactions/interdependencies/interfaces between system
elements (i.e. sub-systems and modules)” (DSMweb.org, 2009). Eppinger and Browning
highlight five advantages that DSM analysis offers in their book Design Structure Matrix
Methods and Applications (2012).
1. Conciseness
2. Improved Visualization
3. Easily Understood and Interpreted
4. Powerful Analysis
5. Flexibility
(Eppinger & Browning, 2012)

Eppinger and Browning recognize the DSMs ability to provide substantial
information of complex processes in a relatively small space. “The DSM highlights
relationship patterns of particular interest to a system designer” (Eppinger & Browning,
2012). Additionally, DSMs provide a system-level view which can support “globally
optimal decision making and help orient those focused on particular elements” (Eppinger
& Browning, 2012). Furthermore, because DSMs are matrices, application of graph
theory and matrix mathematics can be easily applied to the DSM to determine a number
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of quantifiable characteristics of the system. Moreover, DSMs have the capability to be
used and modified to fit the current system or scenario. Since the introduction of DSMs,
“more than three decades ago, many researchers and practitioners have modified and
extended the basic DSM with helpful graphics, colors, and additional data.

New

possibilities continue to develop every year” (Eppinger & Browning, 2012). Because
emergency response is an inherently complex process of managing multitudes of people
and resources, the DSM becomes a powerful tool to simplify and quantify the
characteristics, responsibilities and tasks of emergency response.
The DSM has its start in the product and systems architecture realm, and has since
evolved over the years. The first commonly used square matrix model designed to
represent a system’s components was called the N-square diagram, first formally
introduced to the academic community by R. J. Lano in his book titled A Technique for
Software and Systems Design in 1979, however it is believed that various U.S. aerospace
companies have employed the technique since as early as the 1950s or 1960s (Eppinger
& Browning, 2012). While N-square diagrams are still used today, most notably as a tool
incorporated in the U.S. Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF), the
DSM itself was not introduced until 1994 when researchers at Massachusetts Institute of
Technology introduced the benefits of “distinguishing different types of interactions
among components and of analyzing the model to prescribe alternative architectures with
improved modularity” (Eppinger & Browning, 2012).
Three basic task relationships can be described by the DSM, the parallel
configuration, the sequential configuration and the coupled configuration which can all
be seen in Figure 3 below (Yassine, 2004). An empty square in the DSM indicates tasks
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can be completed simultaneously in parallel, while a single entry below the diagonal
indicates the tasks must be accomplished in series. Additionally, two entries on the
DSM, one below and one above the diagonal indicate the tasks are coupled and must be
accomplished simultaneously in a feedback loop in order for either task to be
accomplished. “The DSM provide insights about how to manage a complex project and
highlights issues of information needs and requirements, task sequencing, and iterations”
(DSMweb.org, 2009).

Figure 3 - Three Configurations that Characterize a System (Yassine, 2004)

Product Architecture and Organization Architecture DSMs.
Eppinger and Browning also identify four primary application types of the DSM.
The four types are the Product Architecture DSM, Organization Architecture DSM,
Process Architecture DSM, and the Multidomain Architecture DSM.

The Product

Architecture DSM is “a mapping of the network of interactions between a product’s
components” (Eppinger & Browning, 2012).

Product Architecture DSMs have minor

applicability to this research. The second type of DSM is the Organization Architecture
DSM. The Organization Architecture DSM is a “mapping of the network of interactions
among the people or units within an organization” (Eppinger & Browning, 2012). This
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DSM model is in many ways simply another method of visualizing and analyzing a social
network.

While not specifically a DSM, Legradi’s (2009) survey research used similar

techniques to the Organizational Architecture DSMs to calculate his SNA metrics.
Organizational Architecture DSMs typically show three attributes of a social network, the
hierarchical decomposition, the lines of authority, and the lateral relationships (primarily
through information flow) (Eppinger & Browning, 2012). Product Architecture and
Organization Architecture DSMs alike can use clustering to strengths of the dependencies
of the components within the system. Usually clustering in an organizational architecture
DSM, is to assign people with similar needs in such a way that promotes communication
and team integration, while clustering in product architecture DSMs are used to group
dependent features within a product together.
Process Architecture DSMs.
The Process Architecture DSM is a “mapping of the network interactions among
the activities in the process” (Eppinger & Browning, 2012). In many ways, the Process
Architecture DSM is a reformatting of more common process flow diagrams such as the
Gantt chart or work flow diagram.

Eppinger and Browning paraphrase Eberhardt

Rechtin’s book System Architecting: Creating & Building Complex Systems (1991) by
recognizing that:
•
•

Relationships among [activities] are what give [processes] their
added value.
The greatest leverage in [process] architecting is at the interfaces.
(Eppinger & Browning, 2012)

Because clustering simply doesn’t make sense in Process Architecture DSMs as it
does in the previous two applications, the most common form of analysis of the Process
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Architecture DSM is sequencing. Sequencing is the process of logically ordering the
activities based on the DSM inputs to determine the optimal progression of tasks and
activities (Eppinger & Browning, 2012). While sequencing algorithms in many DSM
software packages exist, they cannot be used outside the use of reason and critical
thinking by those conducting the analysis. It is typically an iterative process, as the
software can only read what is on the DSM and cannot logically understand the activities
behind the numbers.
Process Architecture DSM Applications.
Process Architecture DSMs grew in popularity in the late 1980s and early 1990s
with major enterprises such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) (Rogers, 1989), Boeing (Browning T. R., 2012) and General Motors (Black,
Fine, & Sachs, 1990) adopting the technique for use within their organizations. James L.
Rogers, a researcher at the NASA Langley Research Center, recognized that within
multidisciplinary organizations with “novel concepts, like large space platforms, the
determination of the subsystems, interactions, and participating disciplines” cannot
always be defined by previously well-established work practices (Rogers, 1989). As such,
Rogers recommended an architecture design process (such as the DSM) to develop a
“hierarchical structure before the planning documents and milestones of the project are
set” (Rogers, 1989).
As part of MIT’s 1997 Lean Aerospace Initiative, Boeing brought in a team of
MIT researchers to document their processes in designing various unmanned combat
aerial vehicles (UCAVs) for the US military. Through detailed interviews with key
stakeholders and follow-up surveys, the researchers were able to develop a process
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architecture DSM of 26 conceptual and preliminary design phase steps and determine the
interactions between each phase. The owners of each design phase then provided the
MIT researchers with estimated phase duration times and costs (optimistic, pessimistic
and most likely), and likelihood of rework and rework impacts due to the inputs/actions
of the other phases in the process.

The researchers then developed a model using the

compiled matrices, and a Monte Carlo simulation which allowed the researchers the
ability to create detailed process duration and cost estimates for the entire process. Then
through the use of sequence analysis the researchers were able to find the process order
which resulted in the most optimized cost and duration estimates.

Because of the

analysis, and due to Boeing’s priority to minimize process duration over cost, Boeing saw
a 7% decrease in new UCAV project durations, but saw a slight increase in cost overruns
(Browning T. R., 2012).

Multidomain Architecture Models
As DSMs have expanded and evolved over the years, a desire grew to develop a
way to represent systems across multiple domains such as the product, process, and
architecture discussed above, as such, the multidomain matrix (MDM) was developed.
The MDM provides for the capability to link multiple DSMs together through the use of
(typically) non-square Domain Mapping Matrices (DMMs) as can be seen in Figure 4
below.

As an example, to link a Process Architecture DSM with an Organization

Architecture DSM, a Process-Organization DMM can be used.

The Process-

Organization DMM would have the same number of rows as the Process Architecture
DSM and the same number of columns as the Organization Architecture DSM. The
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Process-Organization DMM’s use would provide information on who in the organization
is responsible for each task of the process DSM.
Because DSMs across multiple domains can now be linked together the value of
the DSM analysis increases exponentially. Value can be created by “identifying needs
for cross-functional, cross-team interactions in an organization based on interactions
among product components or process activities” (Eppinger & Browning, 2012).
Furthermore, MDMs can help infer interactions between domains where specific
information may be lacking. Additionally, MDMs can develop a more comprehensive
plan for product or process architecting by incorporating more elements, to include tools
and equipment, and strategic goals and objectives (Eppinger & Browning, 2012).
Finally, by incorporating task duration estimates and costs across multiple domains,
individual and team capacities can be estimated, and comprehensive cost analysis across
every domain can be conducted.

Figure 4 - Example of a DMM Linking Two DSMs Together. Adapted from
(Eppinger &29
Browning, 2012)

FLOP and ESF DMM Construct Design
While the ESF DMM construct is already defined by the 15 ESFs plus auxiliary
EOC members, the FLOP construct required some development as there is currently no
set organizational design to integrate the FLOP structure with the current Air Force
organization at the EOC level. By using the definitions of the FLOP functions as defined
by FEMA, the Air Force organizational units fit relatively easily into each category.
Finance & Administration Cell.
“Provides accounting, procurement, time recording, and cost analyses” (FEMA,
2007). The primary Air Force units in the finance and administration cell are:
•

Comptrollers

•

Contracting

•

Force Support Squadron

Logistics Cell.
“Provides support, resources, and all other services needed to meet the operational
objectives” (FEMA, 2007). The primary Air Force units in the logistics cell include:
•

Civil Engineer Squadron

•

Communications Squadron

•

Force Support Squadron

•

Logistics Readiness Squadron

•

Maintenance Group
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Operations Cell.
“Conducts tactical operations and directs all tactical resources” (FEMA, 2007).
The primary Air Force units in the operations cell include:
•

Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) Flight

•

Fire & Emergency Services Flight

•

Medical Group

•

Readiness & Emergency Management Flight

•

Security Forces Squadron

•

Shelter Management Team

Planning Cell.
“Prepares and documents the Incident Action Plan, collects and evaluates
information, maintains resource status and documentation” (FEMA, 2007). The primary
units in the planning cell include:
•

Judge Advocate General

•

Operational Weather Squadron

•

Readiness & Emergency Management Flight

•

Wing Chaplain

While this is not an all inclusive list of every organization that could be required
in an emergency response situation, it covers all those required to respond based off the
CEMP 10-2 checklists for the eight scenarios researched.

Should other units or

stakeholders be required to be integrated into the response, using the definitions of each
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management cell should make it clear where the unit belongs.

Furthermore it is

important to note that some units may fall to multiple cells. For example the personnel
management functions of the Force Support Squadron fall to the finance and
administration cell while Force Support Squadron’s services-type functions fit best in the
logistics cell.

DSM Modeling
The DSM simulation model developed by Browning, Dong, Yassine, and later
updated by Mirshekarian “uses a discrete event simulation to compute the distributions of
duration” for the given DSM inputs. Each task in the DSM is assigned three task
durations, a best case value (BCV), most likely value (MLV), and worst case value
(WCV) which develops the vertices of a triangular probability distribution function
(Browning & Eppinger, 2002) (Browning, Dong, Yassine, & Mirshekarian, 2000). In
addition to the DSM, two additional matrices are introduced as well to indicate the
probability of rework for each given task, and the impact the rework would have on the
entire system. When the model is initially run, each task starts with 100% of the work
yet to be accomplished. The model then determines, based off the DSM inputs, what
tasks can be accomplished and then subtracts the amount of work that can be
accomplished based on the task duration and the assigned time-step interval. The model
continues by repeating itself, progressively accomplishing all tasks until no tasks remain.
A single-run Gantt chart is then developed and the total process duration is recorded
(Browning, Dong, Yassine, & Mirshekarian, 2000).

Because variability is introduced

through both rework and task duration estimates, the simulation is run an assigned
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number of times to develop a more comprehensively accurate process duration estimate
through Monte Carlo simulation until running averages are stabilized around a certain
value.

Lean Value Principles
As DSMs were gaining popularity within industry, MIT was also researching a
new management philosophy based on Toyota’s product development system.

The

philosophy, later coined as Lean Enterprise Value, “is [the] process of eliminating waste
with the goal of creating value” (Murman, et al., 2002). Lean Enterprise Value is based
on five underlying principles, they are:
•

Principle 1 – Create lean value by doing the job right and by doing the
right job.

•

Principle 2 – Deliver value only after identifying stakeholder value and
constructing robust value propositions.

•

Principle 3 – Fully realize lean value only by adopting an enterprise
perspective.

•

Principle 4 – Address the interdependencies across enterprise levels to
increase lean value

•

Principle 5 – People, not just processes, effectuate lean value. (Murman, et
al., 2002)

DSMs become a tool that has application to analyze enterprises against many of these
principles. Murman, et al. recognized that:
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More powerful methods are emerging based on the application of design structure
matrices (DSMs) which provide a powerful visual and analytical tool to
understand how the partitioning of work can affect not only the schedule but also
the information flow throughout the program value stream (Murman, et al., 2002).
Therefore, by incorporating process-organization DMMs, individual capacities can be
calculated to analyze the overall level of effort each individual is required to expel in
order to accomplish the objective. Capacity is “the capability to complete tasks and
usually refers to the volume of resources available for task realization” (Horman, 2001).
In his paper, Modeling the Effects of Lean Capacity Strategies on Project Performance,
Horman (2001) recognized that increasing personnel capacity as a means of eliminating
waste and thus, increasing value, resulted in “yielding significant improvements to
project time and cost performance” (Horman, 2001). Horman further noted that through
his simulations, the “capacity added to generate optimal performance is approximately
80% of that originally provided to the project” (Horman, 2001). Therefore, according to
his research, optimal personnel management should seek to task their personnel as close
to 80% of their capacity as possible.
Additionally, Mihaly Czikszentmihalyi (1997) recognized that flow is an integral
component to optimal performance. “Flow tends to occur when a person faces a clear set
of goals that require appropriate responses. (Czikszentmihalyi, 1997)” An EOC is a prime
example of where flow can occur because each individual is working towards a common
and very clear objective. This sense of flow in the EOC, has the potential to increase
individual performance as each is attempting to meet the needs of those responding to the
emergency.

34

Conclusion
This chapter introduced the concepts of SNA and their application to the field of
Emergency Management. It discussed the application of DSMs in product, organization
and process architectures, and discussed how they can be linked through the use of
DMMs. Finally, this chapter introduced the principles of Lean Enterprise Value, which
become the foundation for research in optimizing organization, in particular Emergency
Operations Centers through the use of capacity calculations. The chapters ahead will
outline the methodology adopted to evaluate performance between the ESF and FLOP
constructs, the results of the analysis and the conclusions and applications generated from
the research.
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III. Methodology
Introduction
This chapter outlines the method used for investigating the effectiveness of Air
Force EOC organization. This research will employ DSMs to independently evaluate the
merits of both the ESF construct and FLOP construct for specific scenarios based on the
required tasks outlined in the Air Force’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan
10-2 (CEMP 10-2). The DSM analysis will simulate the estimated time to complete the
tasks outlined in the CEMP 10-2, and measure the individual capacities of EOC
personnel under both organizational constructs. With this information, the best
organizational structure can be determined, allowing the EOC director to tailor the EOC
staffing based on the current scenario.

Research Plan
While many intermediate steps exist, the general strategy of this research
simplifies to four basic steps. Step one is data acquisition. Process Architecture DSM
analysis requires the specific tasks required to execute the project. While emergencies
inherently introduce uncertainty, the CEMP 10-2 checklist offers a near “comprehensive”
list of tasks that can be expected every time a specific scenario occurs. The second step
is to input the tasks into the Process Architecture DSM. To do this, the dependencies
between tasks are identified to communicate which tasks can be run in parallel, series or
through coupled iterations. The third step is to augment the Process Architecture DSM
with a Process-Organization DMM. The CEMP 10-2 provides responsibility data for
each task identified which is used to populate the Process-Organization DMM. The final
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step is to run the DSM/DMM simulation model to calculate the individual capacities, and
use this information to assess the effectiveness of the two EOC organizational structures
being evaluated.

Data Requirements
The key data requirement to conduct a DSM analysis is a comprehensive list of
tasks or processes that are required to accomplish a given objective. In the case of an
EOC activation and response, this list is never fully complete, as responders could
experience an infinite number of unknowns during any given scenario. However, the
CEMP 10-2 is a valuable document that lists the tasks likely to be accomplished every
time a generalized scenario occurs rather than listing every possible task for every
variation of a given scenario. Therefore the checklists of the CEMP 10-2 offer the
maximum level of detail available for planning purposes, thus providing the data required
for the DSM analysis.
Eight of twenty-eight checklists from the CEMP 10-2 were chosen based on their
dissimilarities in regards to incident type and complexity, allowing for evaluation of the
constructs through multiple criteria to determine what trends, if any can be identified.
The eight scenarios are listed in Table 3 below.
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Table 3 - CEMP 10-2 Scenario Checklists (United States Air Force, 2008)
Checklist
Incident Type Complexity
Nuclear Weapons Accident Checklist
Major
High (100 Tasks)
Accident
Off-Base Aircraft Accident Checklist
Major
High (76 Tasks)
Accident
HAZMAT Response Checklist
Major
High (73 Tasks)
Accident
Response Task Force (RTF) Reception
Major
Low (14 Tasks)
Checklist
Accident
Natural Disaster Checklist
Natural
High (96 Tasks)
Disaster
Disease Containment Checklist
Natural
Medium (45 Tasks)
Disaster
Peacetime Disaster Sheltering
Natural
Low (20 Tasks)
Disaster
Flood Checklist*
Natural
Low (15 Tasks)
Disaster

* The Flood Checklist is an augmenting checklist designed to be run in conjunction with the more
generic Natural Disaster Checklist.

DSM Model Construction
With the eight scenarios selected, individual DSMs were constructed by
identifying the interdependencies of the tasks identified in the checklists. Understanding
that the tasks of the CEMP 10-2 checklists are not necessarily listed in sequential order,
and recognizing that mutually independent tasks can be accomplished simultaneously, it
becomes relatively easy to identify which tasks are dependent upon one another, which
tasks can be run in parallel and which must be run in series. Once these dependencies are
identified they are inputted into the DSM model.
Simulation Characteristics
As discussed in Chapter I, it is reasonable to assume that EOC tasks are
information based, unlike actions occurring at the incident or event. Because the tasks
are based on information flows, the research assumes that task completion durations
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remain fairly constant. Table 4 below shows the BCV, MLV, and WCV values and other
characteristics used for this simulation. The rework probabilities and impacts were
placed at 5% because the work in the EOC during an actual emergency is relatively
simple but with high-stakes, therefore the likelihood of task completion errors is
relatively minimal.

Furthermore, to accommodate for maximum possible scenario

variation, one-thousand simulation runs were accomplished to develop comprehensive
process duration estimates. As discussed in Chapter I, a five-minute time-step duration
was used as a means to overcome the limitation of the maximum 256 time-step intervals
allowed for in the simulation.
Table 4 - DSM Simulation Characteristics
Characteristic
BCV, MLV, WCV
Rework Probability
Rework Impact
Simulation Runs
Time-step Duration

Value
15min, 30min, 45min
5%
5%
1000
5 min

DMM Model Augmentation
Because the DSM can only develop an overall process duration, a second matrix
is required to draw out individual personnel capacity based on the Gantt chart created by
the DSM simulation. As a means of evaluating individual EOC personnel capacity two
DMMs were added to the simulation process.

For each run an ESF and a FLOP

task/personnel matrix was matched against the single-run Gantt chart to calculate the time
requirements of each individual for every DSM task. To take into account the fact that in
many cases multiple organizations have shared responsibilities for many of the identified
tasks, three numerical estimates were used to indicate the relative level of responsibility.
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Currently, no research exists on assigning values by relative level of responsibility,
however preliminary simulation results indicated illogical capacities in positions such as
the EOC Director (whose required capacities exceeded 300%), who stays apprised of the
majority of tasks within the EOC. Through testing, the following inputs brought the
results back to reasonable capacities.
•

1.0 – Those with primary responsibility

•

0.5 – Those with secondary responsibility

•

0.2 – Those with tertiary or minimal requirements to only stay apprised of
task accomplishment

In all cases, at least one organization held primary responsibility for each
individual task. However, the 0.5 and 0.2 values were chosen as an assumption, as no
prior research was found on this topic. Further research could investigate the true amount
of effort those with secondary and tertiary levels of responsibility typically expend to add
further fidelity to the model. Mathematically, these values show the relative percent the
individual contributes based on the estimated task duration. For example, a task that that
is estimated to take 30 minutes calculates that those with primary responsibility spend 30
minutes on the task, those with secondary responsibility will spend 15 minutes on the
task, and finally those with tertiary responsibility only spend 6 minutes. The DSM/DMM
model ran 1000 iterations for each of the eight scenarios under both the ESF and the
FLOP constructs, resulting in stabilized average time durations and percent capacity for
the entire process and each individual.
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DMM Construct Design
Chapter II discussed in detail the DMM development for use with the ESF and
FLOP constructs.

The ESF construct was pre-defined by its current organizational

structure, however, the FLOP structure was required to be developed based on FEMA’s
ICS definitions for each of the four FLOP cells. The following units fell to each of the
four FLOP cells.
Finance & Administration Cell.
•

Comptrollers

•

Contracting

•

Force Support Squadron

Logistics Cell.
•

Civil Engineer Squadron

•

Communications Squadron

•

Force Support Squadron

•

Logistics Readiness Squadron

•

Maintenance Group

Operations Cell.
•

Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) Flight

•

Fire & Emergency Services Flight

•

Medical Group

•

Readiness & Emergency Management Flight
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•

Security Forces Squadron

•

Shelter Management Team

Planning Cell.
•

Judge Advocate General

•

Operational Weather Squadron

•

Readiness & Emergency Management Flight

•

Wing Chaplain

Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics, as the name implies, “are used to describe the basic features
of the data in a study” (Trochim, 2006). Univariate descriptive statistics examine data
across one variable at a time. In univariate analysis, the most common statistical tools
used in descriptive statistics are the mean, median, mode, and standard deviation. The
mean is the most common averaging technique used to describe central tendency. To
calculate the mean all values are summed together and divided by the number of values.
The median is the central most value. The median is found by listing all values in
numerical order and finding the value in the center; for example, if 5 values are used, the
third value numerically is the median.

The mode describes the value that is most

frequently occurring. Finally, the standard deviation shows how much variation exists in
the set of values by comparison to the mean. A high standard deviation indicates high
variability, while a low standard deviation indicates low variability (Trochim, 2006). The
research results of this thesis use both means and standard deviations to describe and
evaluate the data in order to develop conclusions discussed in Chapter V.
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Analytical Statistics and Monte Carlo Simulation
Monte Carlo simulation is an analytical statistical simulation technique “that
approximates solutions to quantitative problems through statistical sampling” (Eckhardt,
Ulam, & von Neumann, 1987). Through use of probability distributions, and random
number generation, a Monte Carlo simulation runs a scenario a large number of times
each of which is equally likely to occur. While each individual result provides little
information for risk analysis, the aggregate of all the results provides a statistically valid
probability distribution researchers can use to develop predictions (Eckhardt, Ulam, &
von Neumann, 1987).

Simulation Process
The final output of the DSM/DMM model collected the overall process duration
estimates for each of the 1000 runs and collected the overall amount of time each
individual EOC member expended during the scenario’s duration.

The individual

member’s time expended was summed across all tasks and then divided by the overall
scenario duration to develop each individual’s percent capacity as seen in Equation 1
below.
C

Individual Time Required
Total Process Duration

(1)
Equation 1

apacity
=
Percent capacities were calculated for each of the ESFs, each of the FLOP
positions, the EOC Manager, the EOC Director, and those positions required to respond,
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but who are not included in one of the previous categories. This data can then be used to
directly compare between constructs to determine overall efficiency between the two
organizational structures. Results of the simulation will be discussed in depth in Chapter
IV, Results while application and significance of the results will be discussed in Chapter
V, Conclusion.
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IV. Results
Introduction
This chapter introduces the results from the research methodology discussed in
Chapter III. The DSM simulation model ran 1000 times and provided average process
durations and standard deviations for each of the eight CEMP 10-2 checklists evaluated.
Additionally, the model calculated individual capacities for both the ESF and FLOP
constructs, providing a basis for quantitative comparison between the two organizational
structures. This chapter outlines and discusses the results of the DSM model simulation
and provides the tabulated information below. Furthermore, a figure has been provided
at the end which evaluates average capacities between the two organizational structures
for each of the eight scenarios, which provides a visual ability to compare the differences
based on scenario complexity, and incident type.

DSM Mean Process Durations
Table 5 below lists the average process duration time as calculated by the 1000
simulation runs of the Browning, Dong, Yassine, and Mirshekarian DSM simulation
model.

These values are only model estimates designed for comparative research

purposes, and therefore unreasonable to use them as an expectation for a real-world
incident’s duration.
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Table 5 - DSM Mean Process Duration Time (min)
HAZMAT
Response

Nuclear
Weapons
Accident

Disease
Containment

Off-Base
Aircraft
Accident

Peacetime
Disaster
Sheltering

Flood
Checklist

RTF
Response
Checklist

721.14

633.55

872.36

470.57

909.71

248.64

240.29

269.68

30.49

27.75

34.41

22.86

32.42

17.24

17.73

19.13

Natural
Disaster
Average
Process
Duration
(min)
Process
Duration
Standard
Deviation

Mean ESF Personnel Capacities
Table 6 below displays the mean ESF personnel capacity. These rates were
calculated by summing the amount of time each individual ESF member spends on their
assigned checklist tasks based on the ESF task assignment DMM and dividing by the
overall process duration times from Table 5.
Table 6 - Mean ESF Personnel Capacities
Natural
Disaster

HAZMAT
Response

Nuclear
Weapons
Accident

Disease
Containment

Off-Base
Aircraft
Accident

Peacetime
Disaster
Sheltering

Flood
Response

RTF
Reception

ESF 1

66.00%

39.74%

36.97%

23.03%

20.86%

0.00%

24.20%

34.68%

ESF 2

57.26%

44.54%

29.83%

16.65%

20.85%

14.67%

15.29%

11.60%

ESF 3

157.82%

30.01%

26.25%

47.33%

17.57%

41.91%

79.59%

69.04%

ESF 4

97.51%

142.12%

118.59%

16.65%

54.40%

2.47%

26.43%

23.12%

ESF 5

79.80%

152.67%

132.81%

15.38%

43.82%

136.91%

37.42%

23.12%

ESF 6

84.23%

39.67%

33.40%

69.56%

29.11%

76.30%

15.29%

57.57%

ESF 7

54.03%

30.01%

26.25%

23.01%

20.88%

39.05%

15.29%

11.60%

ESF 8

120.43%

110.39%

151.80%

132.24%

63.59%

46.43%

15.29%

23.12%

ESF 9

50.00%

30.01%

26.25%

14.09%

17.57%

0.00%

15.29%

11.60%

ESF 10

50.00%

34.85%

26.25%

14.09%

17.57%

0.00%

15.29%

11.60%

ESF 11

50.00%

30.01%

26.97%

14.09%

17.57%

0.00%

15.29%

11.60%

ESF 12

50.00%

30.01%

26.25%

14.09%

17.57%

0.00%

15.29%

11.60%

ESF 13

90.25%

90.94%

123.21%

58.83%

66.78%

29.30%

26.49%

23.12%

ESF 14

50.00%

30.01%

26.25%

14.09%

17.57%

0.00%

13.06%

11.60%

ESF 15

78.21%

59.19%

51.21%

31.25%

27.38%

36.67%

40.74%

11.60%

ESF Average

75.70%

59.61%

57.49%

33.63%

30.21%

28.25%

24.68%

23.11%
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Mean FLOP Personnel Capacities
Mean FLOP capacities were calculated by the same method as the ESF capacities
but using the results from the FLOP task assignment DMM. The results can be found in
Table 7 below.
Table 7 – Mean FLOP Personnel Capacities
Natural
Disaster

HAZMAT
Response

Nuclear
Weapons
Accident

Disease
Containment

Peacetime
Disaster
Sheltering

Off Base
Aircraft
Accident

Flood
Response

RTF
Reception

FINANCE

57.21%

38.73%

29.85%

12.80%

0.00%

27.40%

13.06%

46.21%

LOGISTICS

201.56%

48.41%

51.27%

92.66%

110.67%

34.00%

79.59%

91.90%

OPERATIONS

127.72%

227.66%

244.76%

152.33%

85.77%

137.96%

35.40%

22.82%

PLANS

101.60%

92.10%

61.93%

56.39%

61.00%

50.74%

62.76%

11.31%

FLOP Average

122.02%

101.73%

96.95%

78.55%

64.36%

62.52%

47.70%

43.06%

Mean ESF/FLOP Capacities Comparison
Figure 5 below summarizes the mean ESF and FLOP capacities.

The figure is

ordered by average percent capacities from highest to lowest for the ESF construct.
Coloring was used to distinguish between incident type, browns for major accidents and
blues for natural disasters. Additionally, the use of dark and light color was used to show
the variation in scenario complexity as described in Table 3 from Chapter III above.
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Figure 5 - Comparison of Mean Capacities by Org. Structure
Conclusion
Results showed a significant increase in required capacities when transitioning
from the ESF construct to the FLOP. While in some cases, the average capacities
significantly exceeded 100%, the majority of capacities under the FLOP were simply
brought closer to the goal of 80% capacity as described by Horman’s (2001) research on
lean capacity strategies described in Chapter II. Chapter V will discuss these results indepth and offer conclusions and recommendations on the most effective staffing
strategies based on the results of this research.
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Figure 6 – Example Disease Containment DSM with FLOP Task Responsibility
DMM
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V. Conclusion
Introduction
The goal of this thesis was to investigate whether NIMS and the current AFIMS
structure is the most effective method of organization, or whether while maintaining
NIMS compliance, there may be a better organizational structure the Air Force could
implement in the EOC. To research this, two organizational structures were chosen, and
were evaluated against the tasks of eight scenarios found in the CEMP 10-2 through use
of DSMs. This chapter will discuss the research results and outcomes of the analysis,
provide conclusions and application of the results, and finally end by discussing
recommendations for the future of this research stream.

Generalized Research Application
Before discussing the results of the analysis between ESF and FLOP, there was a
more significant result that came through the development of this research. This research
developed a methodology that quantitatively compares multiple organizational structures
based on a set of pre-defined tasks. The methodology was augmented from the DSM
analysis methodology to include a DMM which allowed for the quantitative analysis of
each position in the organizational structure. This DSM-DMM methodology provides
quantitative evidence to managers and operates as a decision support tool to help in
determining which organizational structure to use based on the tasks and durations
required by the organization. The following pages of this chapter will look specifically at
the organization of Air Force EOCs as a practical example of the application of this
methodology.
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Capacity Results and Discussion
Horman’s (2001) lean capacity research on project performance indicates that
personnel tasked to approximately 80% of their overall capacity increase their
performance by 10-15% (Horman, 2001). Horman (2001) also noted that a decrease in
performance is observed through simulations when capacity is decreased below 80% or
increased above that value. This is additionally confirmed by Jensen (1989) in his stress
management research that indicates that “as the level of attention and motivation increase
(and stress), so does performance. However at very high levels of stress, panic ensues
and performance deteriorates dramatically” (Jensen, 1989)

Based on these two

observations, managers should strive to task their personnel to 80% of their capacity. In
relation to emergency response, due to the potential high stakes that can be experienced,
EOC directors should seek to task their personnel up to 80%, but not exceed 80% to
ensure stress and panic are appropriately managed.
Results from the simulations were as expected. There should be no surprise that
by decreasing the number of positions in the EOC (from 15 ESFs plus auxiliary units to
just the four FLOP positions), the required capacities will inherently increase. What this
quantitatively shows however, is that for seven of the eight scenarios examined, ESFs on
average are reaching less than 60% capacity. In fact most only reach 30% capacity or
below. However, FLOP capacity is significantly increased. On the other hand, in some
of the more demanding scenarios, particularly Natural Disasters and HAZMAT response,
capacities exceed 100%, which is also problematic.
Of the two main research conclusions, the simplest conclusion is that FLOP is
best suited for less complex events, while the ESF construct is still optimal for the more
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demanding scenarios. However, a second solution can also be developed. Because the
organization of the ESF structure is inherently more compartmentalized by responsibility,
tailoring the EOC staffing under the ESF construct is more risky for fear of losing
specific emergency response and recovery capabilities.

However, under the FLOP

construct, it would be generally assumed that work within the individual cells can span
multiple units. For example, the Logistics Cell leader under the FLOP construct would
have ultimate responsibility for any logistical task whether it fell in a traditional logistics
function or to another function such as public works. Because of this expansion of
authority under FLOP, personnel tailoring becomes possible as a method to overcome
exceedingly high workloads. Because tailoring under the FLOP construct is possible, the
individual capacity rates from both the ESF and FLOP constructs can be used to develop
an optimal EOC staffing plan based on the specific scenario. Table 9, below, was
developed using the capacity results of the DSM analysis and attempted to target a
maximum 80% capacity through manning of the FLOP cells. To accomplish this, the
values found in Table 7 were divided by 80% and then rounded up to ensure no personnel
were tasked greater than 80% of their required capacity to ensure those in the EOC were
not subjected to panic. Table 8 below indicates the minimum number of personnel
required for each scenario type.
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Table 8 - Personnel Required to Keep Capacities Below 80%
Natural
Disaster

HAZMAT
Response

Nuclear
Weapons
Accident

Disease
Containment

Peacetime
Disaster
Sheltering

Off Base
Aircraft
Accident

Flood
Response

RTF
Reception

FINANCE

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

LOGISTICS

3

1

1

2

2

1

1

2

OPERATIONS

2

3

3

2

2

2

1

1

PLANS

2

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

In areas where specific expertise is required over typical response and recovery
execution, exceptions were made to ensure the expertise was available in the EOC. To
determine which organization the personnel should be from, data from Table 6 were used
because it indicated which organizations and positions were specifically relied upon
during the response. Table 9 compiles information from Tables 6, 7, and 8 to provide a
recommendation for staffing based on the given scenario and can be used as a decision
support tool to allow EOC Directors to activate only those needed for the given
emergency.
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Table 9 - EOC Staffing Decision Support Tool for EOC Directors

HAZMAT Response

Nuclear Weapons Accident

Off-Base Aircraft Accident

RTF Reception

P
L

P
L

P
L

L

L
F

L
F

L
F

F

F

F
O

F
O

F

O
L

O
L

O

L

O
L

O

O

O

O

L
O

P
O/P

O/P

O/P

O/P

O/P

O/P

O

O

O

O

O

O

P
L

L
L

L

Natural Disaster

Disease Containment

L

Flood

Peacetime Disaster Sheltering

F – Finance & Administration Cell
L – Logistics Cell
O – Operations Cell
P – Planning Cell

Chaplain
Civil Engineer Squadron

P
L

Communications Squadron
Comptroller Squadron

L
F

L
F

Contracting Squadron
Explosive Ordinance Disposal

F

F

Firefighting
Force Support Squadron

O
L

O
L

L

Maintenance Group
Medical Group

O

O

Operational Weather Squadron
Readiness & Emergency Management

P
O/P

Security Forces Squadron

O

Intangible Benefits
Beyond capacity, organizing the EOC based on the FLOP construct has many
other non-quantifiable benefits as well. Because responders on the scene are organized
via the ICS which utilizes the FLOP construct, organizational mirroring has the potential
to open the lines of communication wider than just the Incident Commander and EOC
Director to each of the four FLOP chiefs as well. By doing so, the workload (and
therefore stress) of the incident commander can be significantly reduced, allowing him or
her to focus on the response rather than communication with the EOC. However, this
mirroring also opens the door for a potential drawback of micro-management from the
EOC now that the two entities are similarly aligned.
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Additionally, by having an

organizational structure that can be tailored to the given scenario, EOC directors can
minimize the number of personnel that are activated during an emergency which lowers
the number of those exposed to hazards during the unsafe period, and minimizes potential
distractions from under-utilized personnel within the EOC.

Furthermore, because the

FLOP construct is expandable, additional units that have only specialized use in the EOC
can be easily incorporated within the FLOP without the need for creating new positions.
This adoptive organizational capability has the potential to drastically improve
emergency response effectiveness, reducing organizational redundancy and ambiguities,
and potentially lowering exposure risk by minimizing those who need to respond to the
EOC.

Future Research & Applications
While this research is a starting point for developing optimal staffing during an
emergency response in the Air Force, there are also many areas where this research can
be furthered and expanded upon. First, this research operated under the assumption that
the CEMP 10-2 was a comprehensive list of tasks. Greater fidelity in the results could be
attained by instead observing actual emergency responses, to gather specific tasks
actually being accomplished in the EOC. Furthermore, this would allow the capability to
gather specific task durations for each event which would also increase result fidelity.
Second, this research focused on eight scenario checklists within the Natural Disaster and
Major Accident sections of the CEMP 10-2. Research should be conducted on the FLOP
construct’s applicability in the response of Terrorist Use of Chemical, Biological,

55

Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE), and Conventional Attack
Actions.
An additional stream of research can be focused through the use of surveys. Both
the ESF and the FLOP constructs can be analyzed, and an optimal EOC staffing structure
could be developed through SNA survey results. Complementary SNA research has the
potential to confirm or refute the results of this thesis, and/or develop an entirely new
optimal organizational structure for consideration. Furthermore, it could be beneficial to
conduct live exercises using both organizational constructs to achieve quantifiable
evidence of the efficiencies of both organizational constructs.
To expand upon this specific research, individual values for BCV, MLV, and
WCV could be researched along with more precise values of rework and rework impact.
Research into secondary and tertiary responsibility criteria, and the approximation of how
much work these responsibilities impose could also improve accuracy of the results. This
has the potential to better predict the capacities, and develop a more precise decision
support tool for EOC Directors.
Additionally, the DSM methodology has a number of applications outside the
field of emergency management. It can be used, by itself or in concert with SNA on any
task-based project or program with well defined tasks and personnel manning.

To

maintain an Air Force Civil Engineer perspective, for example, research could be
conducted on the primary tasks and functions of the Civil Engineer Operations Flight, or
the Civil Engineer Squadron as a whole. Furthermore, research could be narrowed to
evaluate the efficiency of specific military construction (MILCON) projects, task by task
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to better understand the organizational and project management functions of military
construction.
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Appendix A – Glossary of Terms
AFIMS – Air Force Incident Management System - A methodology designed to
incorporate the requirements of HSPD-5, the NIMS, the NRP and OSD guidance while
preserving the unique military requirements of the expeditionary Air Force. AFIMS
provides the Air Force with an incident management system that is consistent with the
single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident management. AFIMS provides the
Air Force with the coordinating structures, processes, and protocols required to integrate
its specific authorities into the collective framework of Federal departments and agencies
for action to include mitigation, prevention, preparedness, response and recovery
activities. (USAF, 2007)
BCV – Best Case Value
C2 – Command & Control
Capacity – “The capability to complete tasks… the volume of resources available for
task realization” (Horman, 2001).
CAT – Crisis Action Team – The strategic level of the AFIMS emergency response
organizational structure chaired by the wing commander and staffed by the wing staff and
group commanders.
CEMP 10-2 – Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan 10-2 – provides
comprehensive guidance for emergency response to physical threats resulting from major
accidents, natural disasters, conventional attacks, terrorist attack, and CBRN attacks
(United States Air Force, 2009).
DHS – Department of Homeland Security
DMM – Domain Mapping Matrix – “A (typically) non-square matrix mapping othe
domain of one DSM to the domain of another DSM.” (Eppinger & Browning, 2012)
DSM – Design Structure Matrix – “A network modeling tool used to represent the
elements comprising a system and their interactions, thereby highlighting the system’s
architecture” (Eppinger & Browning, 2012).
EOC – Emergency Operations Center - The C2 support element that directs, monitors,
and supports the installation’s actions before, during, and after an incident. (United States
Air Force, 2009)
ESF – Emergency Support Function - The ESF structure is a standardized 15
organization structure grouping “federal resources and capabilities into functional areas
that are most frequently needed in a national response” (FEMA, 2008) Currently used as
the primary organizational structure of the EOC. A list of the 15 ESFs is found in Table
1 found on page 6.
58

FEMA – Federal Emergency Management Agency - The Federal agency tasked to
establish Federal policies for and coordinate civil defense and civil emergency planning,
management, mitigation, and assistance functions of Executive agencies. (United States
Air Force, 2009)
F - Finance & Adminstration Cell – A cell within the FLOP organizational structure
responsible for providing “accounting, procurement, time recording, and cost analyses”
(FEMA, 2007)
FLOP – The organizational structure of the ICS. It is an acronym for the four major
functions of Finance and Administration, Logistics, Operations, and Plans.
IC – Incident Commander – “The command function is directed by the IC, who is the
person in charge at the incident and who must be fully qualified to manage the response.
Major responsibilities for the IC include: performing command activities, such as
establishing command; protecting life and property; controlling personnel and equipment
resources; maintaining accountability for responder and public safety, as well as for task
accomplishment; and establishing and maintaining an effective liaison with outside
agencies and organizations, including the EOC when it is activated” (United States Air
Force, 2009)
ICS – Incident Command System – “ICS is the model tool for command, control, and
coordination of a response and provides a means to coordinate the efforts of individual
agencies as they work toward the common goal of stabilizing the incident and protecting
life, property, and the environment. ICS uses principles that have been proven to improve
efficiency and effectiveness in a business setting and applies the principles to emergency
response” (United States Air Force, 2009).
L - Logistics Cell – A cell within the FLOP organizational structure responsible for
providing “support, resources, and all other services needed to meet the operational
objectives” (FEMA, 2007).
MDM – Multidomain Matrix – “An extension of the DSM modeling in which two or
more DSM models in different domains are represented simultaneously. Each singledomain DSM is on the diagonal of the MDM and the off-diagonal blocks are DMMs”
(Eppinger & Browning, 2012)
MLV – Most Likely Value
NIMS – National Incident Management System - A system mandated by HSPD-5 that
provides a consistent, nationwide approach for Federal, State, local, and tribal
governments; the private sector; and nongovernmental organizations to work effectively
and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents,
regardless of cause, size, or complexity. To provide for interoperability and compatibility
among Federal, State, local, and tribal capabilities, the NIMS includes a core set of
concepts, principles, and terminology. HSPD-5 identifies these as the ICS; multiagency
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coordination systems; training; identification, and management of resources (including
systems for classifying types of resources); qualification and certification; and the
collection, tracking, and reporting of incident information and incident resources. (United
States Air Force, 2009)
NRCC – National Response Coordination Center – “A multiagency center that
coordinates the overall Federal support for major disasters and emergencies, including
catastrophic incidents in support of operations at the regional-level” (FEMA, 2008)
NRF – National Response Framework – “Presents the guiding principles that enable all
response partners to prepare for and provide a unified national response to disasters and
emergencies - from the smallest incident to the largest catastrophe” (FEMA, 2008).
O - Operations Cell – A cell within the FLOP organizational structure responsible for
conducting “tactical operations and directs all tactical resources” (FEMA, 2007)
P - Plans Cell – A cell within the FLOP organizational structure responsible who
“prepares and documents the Incident Action Plan, collects and evaluates information,
maintains resource status and documentation” (FEMA, 2007).
SNA – Social Network Analysis - Social network analysis views social relationships in
terms of network theory, consisting of nodes (representing individual actors within the
network) and ties (which represent relationships between the individuals, such as
friendship, kinship, organizational position, sexual relationships, etc.) (Knoke & Yang,
2008)
UCC – Unit Control Center – A secondary operational level response organization
within AFIMS. Each unit is required to have a unit control center to assist the EOC and
IC during emergencies.
WCV – Worst Case Value
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